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Abstract
This paper introduces WhylSon, a deductive verification tool for smart contracts
written in Michelson, which is the low-level language of the Tezos blockchain. WhylSon
accepts a formally specified Michelson contract and automatically translates it to an
equivalent program written inWhyML, the programming and specification language of the
Why3 framework. Smart contract instructions are mapped into a corresponding WhyML
shallow-embedding of the their axiomatic semantics, which we also developed in the context
of this work. One major advantage of this approach is that it allows an out-of-the-box
integration with the Why3 framework, namely its VCGen and the backend support for
several automated theorem provers. We also discuss the use of WhylSon to automatically
prove the correctness of diverse annotated smart contracts.
1 Introduction
Smart contracts are reactive programs that perform general-purpose computations within a
blockchain and have been used to encode arbitrarily complex business logic of digital transac-
tion. Since the use of smart contracts has been increasing significantly, and also since smart
contracts cannot be changed once uploaded into a blockchain, it is of paramount importance
to tackle the challenge of formally verifying their safety and correctness. The main focus of our
work is the formal verification of smart contracts for the Tezos blockchain [15]. Moreover, we
will lean towards the Michelson language and its formal specification [24].
Our approach is to make the verification process as automatic as possible. In order to
do that, we chose the deductive program verification platform Why3 [14] as the underlying
proof framework tool in our smart contract verification tool. Why3 is a framework aimed at
automatic theorem proving through the use of external provers such as Alt-ergo [8], Z3 [12] or
CVC4 [2]. Additionally, when a proof obligation can not be automatically discharged, Why3
allows the user to call interactive theorem provers such as Coq or Isabelle.
This document is organised as follows: section 2 discusses how we specified Michelson
language in the Why3 platform. Our axiomatic semantic will be described in section 3. Sec-
tion 4 explains how we generate WhyML code from Michelson. On section 5 we will details
two case studies, and section 6 will provide the reader with a critical analysis over the work
developed. Finally, sections 7 and 8 discuss some of the related work in the field of formal ver-
ification of smart contracts and the main conclusions we gathered throughout the development
of this work.
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2 Mihelson Specification in Why3
Michelson is a stack rewriting language for writing smart contracts for the Tezos blockchain.
For a complete explanations of the Michelson language, we refer the reader to [24]. The
relevant details of this language for this work will be introduced when needed.
In the Michelson language there are four primitive data types for constants, that we can
name: nat, int, string and bytes. Additionally we have type bool for booleans and the
optional type Option τ for some value v of type τ , (similar to the option type in OCaml).
Some of these types are not primitive in Why3 and thus, we had to make some choices on how
to represent them. In order to ease the correspondence between types in each language, we
present the reader with table 1.
Mihelson Primitive Type Corresponding Why3 type (v 1.3.0)
string string
nat nat
int int
bytes seq bv.BV8
bool bool
option τ option τ
unit unit
Table 1: Correspondence between Michelson and Why3 types.
In Michelson, both int (for integer constants) and nat (for natural number constants)
have arbitrary precision, which means that computations with such constants are only limited
by the Gas one is willing to pay. When it comes to Why3, type int already has arbitrary
precision, but we had to manually define type nat as shown in figure 1. Moreover it consists of
a record type with a single field value thus allowing us to add an invariant to type.
type nat = { value: int }
invariant { value ≥0 }
Figure 1: Definition of type nat in Why3.
Why3 supports type string as built-in since Version 1.3.0. Given that a byte is a set of
8 bits, we chose to use BV8 (short for BitVector of size 8). In Michelson all data structures
are immutable, and that property is still maintained with the corresponding types in Why3.
In Michelson, comparisons between constants of the same type are possible. Figure 2
shows the definition of those comparable types in Why3.
Type Mutez represents micro-tez which is in fact the smallest unit of the Tezos blockchain
token. Every operation involving Mutez is mandatory checked for over/underflows. Moreover
this is one of the cases where the type system really helps, because it can assure us that we
do not confuse them for another numerical constant. The Key hash type represents the hash
value of a public key. Additionally, type Timestamp represents a date that can be written in
a readable format according to RFC3339 [20], or in an optimised format, being the number of
seconds since Epoch.
According to the specification in [24], comparison functions in Michelson for two given
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type comparable =
| Int int
| Nat Natural.nat
| String string
| Bytes (seq Bytes.t)
| Mutez int
| Bool bool
| Key_hash string
| Timestamp string
| Address string
Figure 2: Definition of type comparable in Why3.
constants K1 and K2 must return a integer value as shown in equation 1.
compare K1 K2 =


−1 se K1 < K2
0 se K1 = K2
1 se K1 > K2
(1)
In order to abide by the given specification we had to implement our own versions for said
functions. As an example, we present the reader with our implementation of the comparison
function for boolean constants (see figure 3).
let compare_bool (a b: bool) : int =
match a, b with
| False,True → (-1)
| True,False → 1
| _,_ → 0
end
Figure 3: Comparison function for type bool.
Michelson’s execution stack contains only data or instructions, thus the type data is
defined as depicted in figure 4.
In order to ensure that all data is properly constructed, the predicate well formed data is
defined as shown in figure 5.
For the WhyML representation of the Michelson execution stack, we chose an immutable
sequence, naming it type stack t and defining it as follows:
type stack_t = seq well_formed_data.
Additionally we defined a function named typ infer for determining the type of a specific
element in the stack. This function gives us an extra assurance that the stack is well formed
and well typed.
3 Axiomatic Semantics in Why3
In this section we present the reader with some of the more important details of our axiomatic
semantics of Michelson in WhyML. Our approach is a shallow embedding of the Michelson
language in WhyML. Furthermore opcodes such as SEQ do not need to be directly encoded
given that one can take advantage of the WhyML language constructs e.g. let . . . in . . . or
the sequence operator ’;’.
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type data =
| Comparable comparable
| Key
| Unit
| Some_data data
| None_data typ
| List (list data) typ
| Pair data data
| Left data typ
| Right data typ
| Set SetApp.set comparable_t
| Map (my_map data) comparable_t typ
| Big_map (my_map data) comparable_t typ
...
| Mutez_Const
| Chain_ID_Const
| PACK_Const
| Create_Contract_OP
| Transfer_Tokens_OP
| Set_Delegate_OP
| Create_Account_OP
with instruction = (* For convenience, all CAPITAL types are Michelson native instructions *)
| SEQ_I instruction instruction
...
Figure 4: Definition of type data in WhyML.
predicate well_formed_data (d: data) =
match d with
| Map m _ _
| Big_map m _ _ → well_formed_map m
| Left d _
| Right d _
| Some_data d → well_formed_data d
| Pair d1 d2 → well_formed_data d1 ∧ well_formed_data d2
| List lst t → well_formed_data_list lst t
| _ → true
end
with well_formed_data_list (l: list data) (t: typ) =
match l with
| Nil → true
| Cons hd tl → well_formed_data hd ∧ well_formed_data_list tl t ∧ typ_infer hd = t
end
Figure 5: Definition of predicate well formed data in WhyML.
Every Michelson opcode results in an abstract function in WhyML containing a set of
annotations (i.e. rules). Moreover this set of rules defines the expected behaviour of that opcode
and the effect it produces on the stack. All the opcodes take as input (at least) the stack and
return a new stack.
As an example of such abstract function take the opcode ADD defined in [24] as the sum of
the top two elements in the input stack, figure 6 depicts the corresponding WhyML code.
Lines 2-9 of figure 6 define the pre conditions and lines 10-32 define the post conditions for
this particular instruction. Furthermore, lines 4-6 are related with the contents of the stack
whereas lines 7 and 8 concern the type of elements in the stack.
The limit of our formalisation. In the present version of the axiomatic semantics, we do not
have formalised the internal details of the cryptographic operations. We have instead defined
these instructions as abstract operations that follow the expected pre and post conditions. For
4
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val add (s: stack_t) (fuel: int) : stack_t
requires { fuel > 0 }
requires { length s ≥ 2 }
requires { match typ_infer s[0].d, typ_infer s[1].d with
| Comparable_t Int_t, Comparable_t Int_t
| Comparable_t Int_t, Comparable_t Nat_t
| Comparable_t Nat_t, Comparable_t Int_t
| Comparable_t Nat_t, Comparable_t Nat_t → true
| _ → false end }
ensures { length result = length s - 1 }
ensures { match typ_infer s[0].d, typ_infer s[1].d with
| Comparable_t Int_t, Comparable_t Int_t
| Comparable_t Int_t, Comparable_t Nat_t
| Comparable_t Nat_t, Comparable_t Int_t → typ_infer result[0].d = Comparable_t Int_t
| Comparable_t Nat_t, Comparable_t Nat_t → typ_infer result[0].d = Comparable_t Nat_t
| _ → false end }
ensures { forall i: int. 1 ≤ i < length result → result[i] = s[i+1] }
ensures { forall i: int. 1 ≤ i < length result → typ_infer result[i].d = typ_infer s[i+1].d }
ensures { match s[0].d, s[1].d with
| Comparable (Int x), Comparable (Int y) →
let res = x + y in
result = (mk_wf_data res) :: s[2 ..]
| Comparable (Int x), Comparable (Nat y) →
let res = Comparable (Int (x + (eval_nat y))) in
result = (mk_wf_data res) :: s[2 ..]
| Comparable (Nat x), Comparable (Int y) →
let res = Comparable (Int ((eval_nat x) + y)) in
result = (mk_wf_data res) :: s[2 ..]
| Comparable (Nat x), Comparable (Nat y) →
let res = Comparable (Nat (add_nat x y)) in
result = (mk_wf_data res) :: s[2 ..]
| _ → false end }
Figure 6: Definition of ADD in WhyML.
instance, the definition of the sha512 instruction is shown on figure 7.
Because the semantics of serialisation operations is not clear from the reference documen-
tation, we also choose to abstract these operation the same way we handle cryptographic oper-
ations.
val sha512_op (s: stack_t) (fuel: int) : stack_t
requires { fuel > 0 }
requires { length s ≥ 1 }
requires { typ_infer s[0].d = Comparable_t Bytes_t }
ensures { length result = length s }
ensures { forall i: int. 1 ≤ i < length result → result[i] = s[i] }
ensures { typ_infer result[0].d = Comparable_t Bytes_t }
ensures { forall i: int. 1 ≤ i < length result → typ_infer result[i].d = typ_infer s[i].d }
ensures { result = (mk_wf_data Crypto_Hash_Const) :: s[1..] }
Figure 7: Definition of sha512 in WhyML.
4 Automated Translation
In this section we present the reader with some of the most important details about the auto-
matic translation of the Michelson written smart contract into WhyML. For a visual repre-
sentation of the WhylSon plugin structure, we refer the reader to figure 8. In order to obtain
an abstract-syntax tree of a Michelson smart contract we implemented a parser in OCaml and
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Menhir. This parser respects the syntax described on the Tezos documentation [24]. It allows
us to obtain a data type that fully abstracts the syntax (with the exception of annotations)
which we can then manipulate in order to generate the correspondent WhyML. Furthermore,
the automated translation to WhyML using the Why3 API is explained in subsection 4.1.
Additionally, a small example of a translated Michelson contract will be given in subsection
4.2.
Michelson
Contract
Michelson
Parser
Why3 API WhyML
Contract
Why3 Proof
Session
Michelson semantics
in Why3
Figure 8: Visual Structure of the Implementation.
4.1 Why3 API
The core of our development is the translation of a Michelson contract into an equivalent
WhyML program. Our purpose is to be able to feed the generated program to the Why3 proof
engine, in order to conduct formal verification on the original contract1. It is worth highlighting
that our translation is completely done in-memory, i.e., Why3 reads the Michelson file and
no intermediate Why3 file is generated in order to contain the result of translation. This leads
to a very smooth integration with the Why3 framework.
The key insight of our translation mechanism is that we take the AST representation issued
by the Michelson parser and, using the Why3 source code as an OCaml library, we generate
an AST of the WhyML language. We organise our translation code into several mutually-
recursive functions, each one dealing with the translation of a different syntactic element of the
Michelson language. Consider, for instance, the Michelson instruction ADD. For this in-
struction, our parser emits an AST containing the node I_add. To translate this add statement
into this WhyML counterpart, we build the following homomorphic translation
let re inst = funtion
| I_add -> mk_expr (Eidapp (Qident (mk_id "add"), stack_fuel_args))
...
where mk_expr and mk_id are simply smart constructs for WhyML expressions and identifiers,
respectively. The above OCaml code creates an application expression to our axiomatized add
1The correctness of the generated WhyML program implies the correctness of the original Michelson
contract. At the moment, such an argument is based on the informal reasoning that the semantics of Michelson
is captured by the our axiomatic semantics developed in Why3. A more rigorous rationale, which we plan
to develop as future work, must provide mathematical and/or formal evidence that Michelson operational
semantics conforms to our axiomatic encoding
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operation of Figure 6, where the arguments are the current stack and fuel amount. A more
interesting example, and one that shows how we take advantage of underlying translation to
WhyML, is the Michelson SEQ operation. For such Michelson statement, our parser issues
node of the form I_seq (i1, i2), where i1 and i2 are the two instructions composing the
sequence. Our translation engines features the following code for this case:
| I_seq (i1, i2) ->
mk_expr (Elet (mk_id "__stack__", false, Expr.RKnone, inst i1, inst i2))
which builds the expression let __stack__ = i1 in i2. The Boolean constant false above
tells Why3 that this is a non-ghost expression, while the Expr.RKone indicates that this is a
simple locally-defined symbol, with no direct translation to a purely-logical symbol. Let us note
that the tree-like data type produced by our translation corresponds to the AST issued by the
WhyML parser, hence no typing or name resolution information is present at this point.
Having defined our Michelson to WhyML transformation function, we want to integrate
it with the Why3 framework in a completely transparent fashion for the end user. This means
that we want to use theWhy3 proof engine over aMichelson contract, as if this was the native
language of the framework. One can easily extend the Why3 framework with the support for
new input languages via its plugin machinery. This is as simple as providing a parser and a
translation function from the said language into one of the WhyML internal AST. Finally,
in order to register the newly-developed plugin into the Why3 configuration base, one simply
states the extension of files that should be processed by the devised translation. In our particular
case, we write the following:
let () =
Env.register_format mlw_language "michelson" ["tz"] read_channel
~desc:"Michelson format"
Here, mlw language indicates that the target of our translation is a WhyML program and
read channel is the function that calls the Michelson parser and feeds the produced AST
to our transformation mechanism. With all this machinery in place, one can then call Why3
directly on a .tz file. For instance, if one wishes to formally verify the contract contained in
file foo.tz, using our plugin, it is just a matter of doing
$ why3 ide foo.tz
which would open the Why3 graphical Integrated Development Environment over the result
of the Michelson contract translation.
4.2 A Trivial Example
For a better understanding of this automated translation, we present the reader with a visual
toy example. Consider the Michelson contract depicted in figure 9.
parameter nat ;
s to r age nat ;
code { UNPAIR; ADD;
NIL ope ra t i on ; PAIR } ;
Figure 9: Toy example of a Michelson contract.
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This is a very simple contract, in fact it takes the nat it received as parameter and adds it
to the nat in the storage. Basically it just adds two natural numbers. As shown by the figure
above, the Michelson contract does not contain any pre or post conditions, but WhylSon is
able to directly infer four safety conditions, namely about the length and type of both the input
and the output stacks. The WhyML code generated by WhylSon is shown in figure 10.
use axiomatic.AxiomaticSem
use dataTypes.DataTypes
use seq.Seq
use int.Int
let test (__stack__: stack_t) (__fuel__: int) : stack_t
requires { (length __stack__) = 1 }
requires { __fuel__ > 0 }
requires { (typ_infer (d (__stack__[0])))
= (Pair_t (Comparable_t Nat_t ) (Comparable_t Nat_t )) }
ensures { (length result) = 1 }
ensures { (typ_infer (d (result[0])))
= (Pair_t (List_t Operation_t ) (Comparable_t Nat_t )) } =
let __stack__ =
let __stack__ = unpair __stack__ __fuel__ in
(let __stack__ = add __stack__ __fuel__ in
(let __stack__ = nil_op __stack__ __fuel__ Operation_t in
(pair __stack__ __fuel__))) in
__stack__
Figure 10: The WhyML generated code for the toy example.
Using only the split vc transformation this example generates 26 verification conditions
that are quickly dispatched by Alt-ergo[8].
5 Case Studies
In this section we discuss two case studies, namely the multisig and factorial smart contracts
and explain how safety and functional correctness can be proved within WhylSon. For the
sake of brevity we will elaborate on the details the proof of safety for the multisig smart contract
and on the functional correctness of the factorial smart contracts. We will detail the proof of
correctness of the factorial smart contracts since this contract highlight particularly well our
purpose to show the advantages but also the drawbacks of our approach.
Both of these contracts were manually translated to WhyML. The complete details of the
formalisation and the proof of these smart contracts can be found at https://gitlab.com/
releaselab/fresco/whylson
5.1 Multisig
There are several versions of the multisig contract, and the one we used can be found in [25].
We separated the multisig contract into three parts. The first one is the majority of the
contract, the second one is the loop which iterates over the list of keys and optional signatures
(iter multisig) and finally, the third part (outer if left) is where the operation requested
by the signers is produced. For the sake of brevity, these fuctions are not depicted here.
Figure 11 contains the part of the multisig function that represents the contract. We ask
the reader to notice that it has only two pre conditions and two post conditions regarding the
size and the type of the stack. In order to prove the last post condition, we had to equip
some of the code in the contract with some additional typing information. An example of such
8
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let multisig_contract (in_stack: stack_t) (fuel: int) : stack_t
requires { fuel > 0 }
requires { length in_stack = 1 }
requires { typ_infer in_stack[0].d = Pair_t parameter storage }
ensures { length result = 1 }
ensures { typ_infer result[0].d = Pair_t (List_t Operation_t) storage }
raises { Failing }
=
let s = unpair in_stack fuel in
let s = swap s fuel in
let s = dup s fuel in
...
let s = iter_multisig s fuel
ensures {
typ_infer result[0].d = Comparable_t Nat_t ∧ (* @ valid *)
typ_infer result[1].d = List_t (Option_t Signature_t) ∧
typ_infer result[2].d = Comparable_t Bytes_t ∧
typ_infer result[3].d = Or_t
(Pair_t (Comparable_t Mutez_t) (Contract_t Unit_t))
(Or_t
(Option_t (Comparable_t Key_hash_t))
(Pair_t (Comparable_t Nat_t) (List_t Key_t))) ∧
typ_infer result[4].d = storage
} in
...
Figure 11: Part of the multisig contract in WhyML.
typing information is the one below the iter multisig line. Furthermore, this complement
was necessary to help the SMTs check some of the pre conditions needed for the instructions
in the middle.
This code generated a total of 758 VCs, 750 of which were dispatched by Alt-ergo [8], Z3
[12] and CVC4[2] dispatched 4 verification conditions each.
5.2 Factorial
The contract depicted in figure 12 is the Michelson version of the factorial calculation. This
contract calculates the factorial of a given natural number interactively. The contract receives
as parameter the number whose factorial is going to be calculated and stores the result in
the storage. It starts by dropping the previous storage and pushes an initial accumulator and
iterator as the value 1. Then it compares the parameter value with 0 and if it’s different, it
enters the loop to calculate the factorial.
Inside the loop body, the stack has size three, where the top element is the temporary result,
the middle element is the index of the iteration and the bottom element is the input parameter.
Since the body of the loop is where the computation actually happens, we will focus on the
respective portion of WhyML code depicted in figure 13. For shortness we omitted typing
information in between instructions as well as size and length pre and post conditions. The
only specification that we left was the one regarding functional correctness.
The first pre condition assures us that the value stored at the top of the input stack is in
fact the value of factorial up to the previous iterations. The last post condition ensures that the
value stored at the top of the result stack is the value of factorial up to the current iteration.
This code generated 2890 VCs, of which 2671 were dispatched by Alt-ergo[8], and the remaining
219 by Z3[12].
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parameter nat ;
s t o rage nat ;
code { CAR; PUSH @index nat 1 ; DUP @acc ;
DIP 2 { DUP; PUSH nat 0 ; COMPARE; NEQ } ;
DIG 2 ;
LOOP { DIP { DUP;
DIP { PUSH nat 1 ; ADD @ipp } } ;
MUL;
DIP { DIP { DUP } ;
DUP;
DIP { SWAP } ;
COMPARE; LE } ;
SWAP } ;
DIP { DROP; DROP } ;
NIL operat ion ; PAIR } ;
Figure 12: Factorial Michelson contract.
let loop_body (s: stack_t) (fuel: int) : stack_t
requires { match s[0].d,s[1].d with
| Comparable(Nat res),Comparable(Nat n) → fact (n.value - 1) = res.value
| _ → false end }
ensures { match s[0].d,s[1].d with
| Comparable (Nat res_old), Comparable (Nat n_old)→
fact n_old.value = n_old.value * res_old.value
| _ → false
end }
ensures { match s[1].d, result[1].d with
| Comparable (Nat i), Comparable (Nat b) → fact i.value = b.value
| _ → false end }
=
let s =
let top = s[0] in let s = s[1..] in (* DIP *)
let s = dup s fuel in
let s =
let top = s[0] in let s = s[1..] in (* DIP *)
let s = push s fuel (mk_wf_data (Comparable (Nat (to_nat 1)))) in
let s = add s fuel in
push s fuel top in
push s fuel top in
let s = mul s fuel in
let s =
let top = s[0] in let s = s[1..] in (* DIP *)
let s =
let top = s[0] in let s = s[1..] in (* DIP *)
let s = dup s fuel in
push s fuel top in
let s = dup s fuel in
let s =
let top = s[0] in let s = s[1..] in (* DIP *)
let s = swap s fuel in
push s fuel top in
let s = compare_op s fuel in
let s = le s fuel in
push s fuel top in
swap s fuel
Figure 13: Factorial WhyML contract.
6 Critical Analysis and Future Work
As stated in the previous sections, we choseWhy3 as the main tool for our approach at verifying
Tezos smart contracts based on one simple goal, that was to automate as much as possible
10
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the verification effort on the user side. Despite this being a clear and well defined objective, we
came across some adversities which will be explained in the remainder of this section.
As shown in subsection 2 we defined numerous algebraic data types to reflect the grammar
of the Michelson language in a direct correspondence. This decision has proven itself to have
consequences, since SMTs find them very hard to work with. One possible solution is to go even
further in our shallow embedding and try to map as much as possible every Michelson type
directly into WhyML native types. Moreover this would allow us to remove some algebraic
constructors from our definition. We first came across with this issue when trying to prove
safety properties of longer contracts, as in the case of multisig. Somewhere in the middle of the
contract one could notice that the SMTs were struggling to prove some pre and post conditions
regarding the type that the instructions were expecting. In an attempt to minimise their effort,
we decided to propagate typing information throughout the contract. This was a very time
consuming process, because, even if the task is systematic, we had to do it manually. This
indicates that there is a clear room for automation here. As a future improvement one could
write an interpreter that would work alongside the translation mechanism and automatically
propagate such conditions throughout the generated WhyML code.
When it comes to functional correctness of a Michelson written contract, it is far from
simple for one to infer what a contract does just by looking at it. SinceWhylSon is not parsing
specification from Michelson contracts yet, we had to add it manually to the contracts we
tested. When proving the functional correctness of the factorial contract, we noticed that al-
most every proof needed numerous assertions in the middle of the WhyML code. Additionally,
the proof trees for these goals were far too long, but were almost entirely based on hypoth-
esis rewriting. Going forward we think that we might adopt some sort of proof by reflection
mechanism [6, 18] so that this proving process becomes less tedious.
Finally the fact that Michelson is a stack rewriting language makes us operate solely over
one data structure with no clear separation between values and instructions. This also increases
the struggle that SMTs have when it comes to guaranteeing some frame conditions. With this
thought in mind, we are considering adopting a higher level language such as Albert [5] or an
intermediate representation Tezla [22]. On one hand, if we choose to go with Albert, we would
use it as the input language toWhylSon and then using theWhy3 code extraction mechanism
described in [21] one could extract the Michelson certified code. Furthermore this last effort
only amounts to writing a new printer that translates the internal Why3 AST into compilable
Michelson code. On the other hand if we decide to go with Tezla the input language stays
the same (i.e. Michelson) but the WhyML generated code would be based on Tezla which
we think would facilitate some of the proofs.
7 Related Work
When it comes to formal verification of smart contracts, there are some efforts towards the
design of verification platforms for said contracts. For instance, the work of Nehai, Z. e Bobot,
F. presented in [19] where they use Why3 to write smart contracts for the Ethereum blockchain
[9]. Also Bhargavan, K., et al. developed a framework for analysis and verification of functional
correctness of Ethereum (ETH) smart contracts by translation into F ∗ [7]. Moreover, for the
same blockchain, Abdellatif, T. and Brousmiche, K. used the BIP framework [3] for modeling
and verifying said contracts using statistical model checking. Using the Coq Proof Assistant,
Zheng Yang and Hang Lei combined symbolic execution with higher order theorem proving into
a tool called FEther aimed at verifying Ethereum smart contracts [26]. The CertiK company
has developed a commercial framework for formally verifying smart contracts and blockchain
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ecosystems [10]. Marvidou, A. and Laska, A. presented FSolidM in [17], a framework that
allows its users to write more secure contracts for ETH using a graphical interface for designing
finite state machines that will then be automatically translated into ETH smart contracts. In
[23], Sergey, I., et al. describe SCILLA, an intermediate language for ETH smart contracts
that is amenable to formal verification.
When it comes to Michelson formalisation, Bernardo, B., et al. specified a big-step se-
mantic for Michelson using the Coq proof assistant [4] that serves as a base for a verification
framework. This work differs from ours because we focus on the automation of the verifica-
tion process. This fact relies on Why3 where the proof obligations are dispatched to external
provers, where as in Coq the proof is made manually. The Archetype language [13] is a do-
main specific language that allows for formal specification of Tezos smart contracts, which in
turn are translated to WhyML for use in Why3, as a back-end. In this work, the contracts
to be verified are Archetype contracts. Moreover, we chose Michelson as the object of our
verification process, thus mitigating the need for the smart contract writer to learn yet another
language for smart contract development.
8 Conclusions
In this paper we presented WhylSon, a tool for automated formal verification of Michelson
smart contracts. Moreover,WhylSon is the result of several implementations also described in
this document, namely aMichelson parser, an axiomatic semantics and a translation function,
all leading to a shallow embedding of Michelson in WhyML.
The first steps to the automatic proof in Why3 of manually annotated Michelson smart
contracts were done, since we were able to use our axiomatic semantics and our Why3 plugin
to successfully write and prove several Michelson contracts. Furthermore, the plugin devel-
opment proved itself simple, due to the fact that the Why3 platform exposes its API as an
OCaml library.
In practice we found that some of the proof trees were bigger than expected and required
user intervention, thus threatening our main purpose of automation. We are aware that this is a
consequence of our encoding of Michelson types as tree-like data structures. Our perspective
is that using one or more of the solutions discussed in 6 we can mitigate this issue, leading us
to a platform that allows the user to conduct formal verification of Michelson written smart
contract with an elevated degree of automation.
As a final thought, we think that proving Michelson contracts has a certain advantage
over proving some other formulation, since what is effectively executed is the Michelson smart
contract and also because this approach can be used a back-end in developing reliable smart
contract in any higher level language such a LIGO[1] or SmartPy[16].
Nevertheless, smart contracts developers will implement their smart contracts in a higher
level language than Michelson. In this setting, it is also relevant to be able to formally prove
these smart contracts at a level that programmers understand and be involved with. So an
interesting long-term line of work to explore is to connect WhylSon with certifying-certified
compilation techniques and platforms. For instance, we should evaluate how the integration of
WhylSon with, e.g., the Archetype platform [13], that also makes use of Why3, can benefit
the automatic proof of Michelson smart contracts. We should also evaluate how WhylSon
could benefit from rigorously designed compilers as the one designed for Albert [5] to Mi-cho-coq
[4]. For the Why3 platform, such an endeavour could make use of the techniques introduced
by Clochard, M., et al. in [11].
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